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1. Introduction 
 
An important aspect, observed in the last decade with the diffusion of Information and 
Communication Technologies, is the adoption by many firms of new organizational practices 
(for instance job rotation, work teams, quality norms), characterized by a tendency towards 
multi-tasking. This phenomenon initially appeared in the United States, and then has 
expanded over to Europe. As a consequence, a consistent literature has studied the effects of 
these organizational changes, both on firms performance on the one hand and on working 
conditions (in particular occupational health and safety) on the other hand. With reference to 
the first aspect, most of these works show a positive impact of new work practices on 
productivity, and an effect represented by upskilling of workers. With reference to the second 
aspect, the available studies (see for instance Fairris and Brenner, 2001, Askenazy, 2001, 
Ramaciotti and Perriard, 1999, Askenazy, Caroli and Marcus, 2002) lead to conflicting 
conclusions, since some of them evidence a positive relation between new organizational 
practices and workers well-being (for instance quality norms reduce failures, improving 
occupational safety, and job rotation makes work more interesting), while others evidence 
opposite results (new work practices increase the pressure on workers for performance, 
raising the risk of injuries as well as mental strain). 
 
It is therefore crucial to clarify these aspects, since the working conditions in the new 
economy are a key element that must be taken into account in the evaluation of the 
performance and of the long-run viability of the new productive paradigms. In particular, if 
the new work practices increase the risk of work injuries or illnesses we would have increase 
of absenteeism and of social conflicts and decrease of workers' satisfaction and of labor 
productivity, and this would affect the future development of the “new economy”. 
 
In such a context, this paper considers a theoretical model that tries to study some effects 
of multi-tasking in an economy in which individuals devote time both to production and to 
human capital accumulation, and in which they are involved in many tasks. In this model, the 
presence of multi-tasking gives rise to coordination costs for the firms (an increase in the 
number of tasks per worker increases output but it also reduces profits through an increase in 
coordination costs, due to interactions among tasks) and to disutility for the individuals (an 
increase in the number of tasks per worker increases work rhythms, and in this way it induces 
disutility). The paper considers both the decentralized economy (in which households and 
firms solve separately their optimization problems) and the centralized economy (in which a 
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central planner acts), and it shows that the social optimum is characterized, at the steady-state, 
by a number of tasks per worker lower than the number obtained in the decentralized 
economy. Furthermore, also production and consumption are lower in correspondence of the 
social optimum than in the decentralized economy. The decentralized solution in this model is 
therefore sub-optimal, and the last part studies a policy that can be implemented in order to 
correct such sub-optimality. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
The model considers an economy in discrete time (from 0 to ∞) with an active population 
of size L  (it is then possible to normalize it, i.e. to assume 1=L ). The production side is 
characterized by a representative firm that produces according to the technology: 
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where 10 << α , tA  is a productivity parameter, tL  is the number of workers with human 
capital th , )(ixt  is the time devoted to task i and tn  is the number of tasks performed per 
worker. 
The worker's productive time is equal to tT , hence we also have the constraint: 
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Since tasks are symmetric we then have tt xix =)( , from the constraint this implies that 
ttt nTx /= , and substituting in the first expression we obtain the production function: 
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The profits (assuming the price of output equal to 1) are then given by: 
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where 0, >θd , tw  is the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor and ( )θ1/ −⋅ ttt nnd  represents 
coordination costs. In effect, increasing the number of tasks per worker raises coordination 
costs because of interactions among tasks (see Becker and Murphy, 1992), hence multi-
tasking not only increases output but it also induces coordination costs which reduce profits.  
 
 The consumption side is characterized by a representative household that has a utility 
function given, in the general form, by: 
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where 0>τ , tc  is consumption and )( tnφ  represents the disutility for the individuals of 
multi-tasking (with 0)(' <tnφ  and 0)('' ≤tnφ ), since increasing the number of tasks per 
worker increases work rhythms, and work intensification induces disutility (see Askenazy, 
2001). 
To simplify the analysis we then choose 1=τ  and we assume that the disutility of multi-
tasking takes the form σγφ +⋅−= 1)()( tt nn  with 0>γ  and 0≥σ  (this constant elasticity form 
of the disutility of multi-tasking guarantees a constant equilibrium number of tasks in the 
steady-state), so that the utility function becomes: 
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The household holds assets ta  and is endowed with one unit of time each period, that is spent 
on working (the fraction tT ) or on human capital accumulation (the fraction tT−1 ), and the 
accumulation of human capital is described by the following equation: 
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where 0>δ  and tE  is an efficiency parameter. 
It is now possible to consider first of all the decentralized economy, where the firm and 
the household solve their optimization problems separately, and then the centralized 
economy, where a central planner acts, and to analyze the steady-state solutions in these two 
cases.  
 
 
3. The decentralized solution and the social optimum 
 
The decentralized economy is characterized by the fact that household and firm solve 
separately their optimization programs. In particular, the household’s intertemporal 
optimization problem is: 
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where β  is the discount factor (with 10 << β ) and tr  is the interest rate, and the household 
chooses, for each period, the level of consumption, the fraction of time spent on working, the 
assets held and the level of human capital. 
The firm’s intertemporal optimization problem is then given by: 
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and the firm chooses, for each period, the number of tasks performed per worker and the 
number of workers.  
On the other hand, the centralized economy is characterized by the presence of a central 
planner that solves the following intertemporal optimization problem: 
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and the central planner chooses, for each period, the level of consumption, the fraction of time 
individuals spend on working, the level of human capital and the number of tasks per worker. 
 
For these problems it is possible to write the equations that characterize the steady-state, 
and to find the corresponding values of the different variables. The main result that can be 
obtained is that, at the steady-state, the centralized economy is characterized by a number of 
tasks per worker, a level of production and a level of consumption lower than the 
corresponding values in the decentralized economy. This is due to the fact that in a centralized 
economy the central planner takes into account the disutility on individuals caused by an 
excessive number of tasks per worker, while in a decentralized economy this aspect is 
neglected by the firms that choose the number of tasks performed. The results in this latter 
case are therefore sub-optimal, and the fact that the number of tasks performed in a 
decentralized economy is too high with respect to the social optimum is consistent with the 
empirical findings according to which new work practices (that involve multi-tasking) have 
negative effects on the working conditions of the individuals. The last aspect considered, then, 
consists in finding a policy that can be implemented in order to correct such sub-optimality of 
the decentralized economy. 
 
 
References 
 
(1) Askenazy, P. (2001), “Innovative Workplace Practices and Occupational Injuries and 
Illnesses in the United States”, Economic and Industrial Democracy 22 (4). 
 
(2) Askenazy, P., E. Caroli and V. Marcus (2002), “New Organizational Practices and 
Working Conditions: Evidence from France in the 1990’s”, Recherches Economiques de 
Louvain 68 (1-2), 91-110. 
 
(3) Becker, G. S. and K. M. Murphy (1992), “The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs, and 
Knowledge”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (4), 1137-1160. 
 
(4) Boucekkine, R. and P. Crifo (2003), “Human Capital Accumulation and the Transition 
from Specialization to Multi-Tasking”, Université  Catholique de Louvain, CORE 
Discussion Paper 2003/80.  
 
(5) Fairris, D. and M. Brenner (2001), “Workplace Transformation and the Rise in 
Cumulative Trauma Disorder”, Journal of Labor Research 22 (1), 15-28. 
 
(6) Ramaciotti, D. and J. Perriard (1999), “Certification qualité selon ISO 9000 et fréquence 
des accidents du travail dans un groupe d’entreprises suisses”, Actes du XXXIVème 
Congrès de la SELF-CAEN, 653-660. 
